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Summary findings
Foreign direct investment may promote  economic  efficiency may improve, especially if protection does not
development by helping to improve productivity growth  guarantee an easy life for the multinational affiliate.
and exports in the multinationals' host countries,  However, most available evidence has to do with
conclude Blomstrbm and Kokko, after reviewing the  multinationals' entry into host countries'  industries
empirical evidence. But the exact relationship between  rather than with their presence - the dynamic aspects of
foreign multinational corporations and their host  multinationals' relationship to their competition in host
economies seems to vary between industries and  country markets.
countries.  Most evidence on multinationals' effects has to do
Multinational  corporations mainly enter industries  with effects in industrial countries, and it is impossible to
where barriers to entry and concentration  are relatively  disregard the risk that the multinationals'  entry into
high, and at first they increase the number of firms in the  developing countries may replace local production  and
host country market. In the long run, they may  force local firms out of business, rather than force them
contribute to a more concentrated  market, although  to become more efficient.
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NBIER  and CEPRForeword
As regional trading arrangements  (RTAs) have spread, enlarged and deepened over the last
decade, they have posed challenges  to economists on both intellectual and policy levels. On the
former, do RTAs stimulate growth and investment, facilitate technology transfer, shift comparative
advantage towards high value-added activities, provide credibility to reform programs, or induce
political stability and cooperation? Or do they, on the other hand, divert trade in inefficient
directions and undermine the multilateral trading system?
The answer is probably "all of these things, in different proportions according to the
particular circumstances of each RTA." This then poses the policy challenge of how best to
manage RTAs in order to get the best balance of benefits and costs. For example, should technical
standards be harmonized and, if so, how; do direct or indirect taxes need to be equalized; how
shoulcl  RTAs manage their international  trade policies in an outward-looking fashion?
Addressing these issues is one important focus of the research program of the International
Trade Division of the World Bank. It has produced a number of methodological innovations in the
traditional area of trade effects of RTAs and is now starting  to tackle four new areas of research: the
dynanlics of regionalism (e.g., convergence,  growth, investment, industrial location and migration),
deep integration (standards, tax harmonization), regionalism and the rest of the world (including its
effects on the multilateral trading system), and certain political economy dimensions of regionalism
(e.g., credibility and the use of RTAs as tools of diplomacy).
In addition to thematic work, the program includes a number of studies of specific regional
arrangements, conducted in collaboration with the Regional Vice Presidencies of the Bank.  Several
EU-Mediterranean Association Agreements have been studied and a joint program with the staff of
the Latin American and Caribbean Region entitled "Making  the Most of Mercosur"  is under way.
Future work is planned on African and Asian regional integration schemes.
Regionalism and Development findings have been and will, in future, be released in a
number of outlets. Recent World Bank Policy Research Working Papers concerning these issues
include:
Glenn Harrison, Tom Rutherford and David Tarr, "Economic Implications for Turkey
of a Customs Union with the European Union," (No. 1599).
Maurice Schiff, "Small is Beautiful, Preferential Trade Agreements and the Impact of
Country Size, Market Share, Efficiency and Trade Policy," (No. 1668).
L. Alan Winters, "Regionalism versus Multilateralism,"  (No. 1687).
Planned future issues in this series include:
Eric Bond, "An Operational Model for Assessing Preferential Trading Arrangements"
Sherry Stephenson, "Standards, Conformity Assessments and Developing Countries"ii
Maurice Schiff and L. Alan Winters, "Regional Integration as Diplomacy"
Magnus Blomstrom and Ari Kokko, "Regional Integration and Foreign Direct
Investment: A Conceptual Framework and Three Cases"
Anthony Venables and Diego Puga, "Trading Arrangements and Industrial
Development"
L. Alan Winters and Won Chang, "Integration and Non-Member Welfare: Measuring
the Price Effects"
Glenn Harrison, Thomas Rutherford and David Tarr, "Trade Policy Options for Chile:
A Quantitative Evaluation"
In addition, Making the Most of Mercosur will be issuing papers over the next few months,
including:
Alexander J. Yeats, "Does Mercosur's Trade Performance Raise Concerns About the
Effects of Regional Trade Arrangements?"
Claudio Frischtak, Danny M. Leipziger and John F. Normand, "Industrial Policy in
Mercosur: Issues and Lessons"
Sam Laird (WTO), "Mercosur Trade Policy: Towards Greater Integration"
Margaret Miller and Jerry Caprio, "Empirical Evidence on the Role of Credit for SME
Exports in Mercosur"
Malcom Rowat, "Competition Policy within Mercosur"
For copies of these papers or information  about these programs con t act Maurice Schiff, The
World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20433.
An additional major outlet for World Bank-sponsored  research on regionalism will be the
Annual Bank Conference on Development in Latin America, 1997, Montevideo, June 30-July 2,
1997, organized by the Office of the Chief Economist and the Technical Department for Latin




International Economics Department1. Introduction
Economic theory provides two approaches to studying the effects of foreign direct investment
(FDI) on host countries. One is rooted in the standard theory of international trade and dates back
to MacDougall (1960).This is a partial equilibrium comparative-static approach intended to
examine how marginal increments in investment from abroad are distributed. The main
prediction of the model is that inflows of foreign capital - whether in the form of FDI or portfolio
capital -will raise the marginal product of labor and reduce the marginal product of capital in the
host country. In addition, MacDougall suggests that FDI may be connected to other potentially
importEnt  benefits:
The most important direct gains ... from more rather than less private investment from
abroad seem likely to come through higher tax revenue from foreign profits (at least if the
higher investment is not induced by lower tax rates), through economies of scale and
through external economies generally, especially where (domestic) firms acquire "know-
how" or are forced by foreign competition to adopt more efficient methods. (MacDougall,
11960,  p. 34)
There is no a priori argument, however, as to the relative importance of these various benefits in
the MacDougall model.
The other approach departs from the theory of industrial organization, and was pioneered
by Hymer (1960). Other important contributions have made by Buckley and Casson (1976),
Caves (1971), Dunning (1973), Kindleberger (1969), and Vernon (1966), among others (for anoverview, see Dunning, 1993 or Caves, 1996). The starting point here is the question why firms
undertake investment abroad to produce the same goods as they produce at home. The answer
has been formulated as follows: "For direct investment to thrive there must be some imperfection
in markets for goods or factors, including among the latter technology, or some interference in
competition by government or by firms, which separates markets" (Kindleberger, 1969, p. 13).
Thus, to be able to invest in production in foreign markets, a firm must possess some asset (for
example, product and process technology or management and marketing skills) that can be used
profitably in the foreign affiliate. Firms investing abroad therefore represent a distinctive kind of
enterprise and the distinctive characteristics are pivotal when analyzing the impact of foreign
direct investment on host countries. The entry of a multinational corporation (MNC) represents
something more than a simple import of capital into a host country, which is generally how the
matter is treated in models rooted in traditional trade theory.
This distinction is particularly important for developing countries, where domestic
enterprises are likely to be relatively small, weak, and technologically backward. These countries
also differ from the developed ones in such aspects as market size, degree of protection, and
availability of skills. The entry of  MNC subsidiaries into LDCs may therefore have effects, both
positive and negative, which are substantially different from those that occur in developed host
countries.
Although the traditional trade theory approach and the industrial organization approach are
not mutually exclusive, they have so far generally emphasized different aspects of capital
movements. Trade theorists have mainly been interested in the direct effects of foreign
investment (direct as well as portfolio investment) on factor rewards, employment, and capital
flows, while those following the industrial organization approach have put more emphasis on
indirect effects or externalities. In this study, we will adopt an industrial organization approach,
and focus on issues related to the transfer and diffusion of technology and knowledge, as well as
the impact of FDI on market structure and competition in host countries. In the next two sections,
we will discuss the role of MNCs in the international technology market, and review the
empirical evidence on spillovers of technology from MNCs to local host country firms. In
2section 4, we go on to examine the impact of FDI on the host countries' trade performance.
Section 5 examines the effects of FDI on industry structure and competition, while section 6
summarizes and concludes the paper.
2. Voluntary and Involuntary Diffusion of MNC Technology
It is we-ll  known that MNCs undertake a major part of the world's private research and
development (R&D) efforts and produce, own, and control most of the world's advanced
technology. It is also known that the multinationals' R&D and technology is heavily
concerntrated  to a few home countries, unlike MNC investment, production, and employment that
are more widely spread across both industrialized and developing economies.
A few summary statistics can demonstrate this clustering of technology production. Over
four fifths of the global stock of FDI originates from the half dozen home countries that dominate
the world's research and technology: the US, the UK, Japan, Germany, Switzerland, and the
Netherlands. On average, about a third of the total sales and the total employment of the MNCs
based in these countries were accounted for by their foreign affiliates in the early 1990s (see
Lipsey, Blomstrom and Ramstetter, 1995). However, less than 10 per cent of the R&D
expen(litures of e.g. US manufacturing MNCs were undertaken in their majority-owned foreign
affiliates, and more than half of this was recorded by the affiliates located in the UK and
Germany. Detailed data on the R&D expenditures of the MNCs based in the other main home
countries are not available, but the pattern is likely to be similar and it is not very controversial to
conclude that foreign MNCs are the most important sources of modem technology for most
economies.
But although we know that MNCs produce and own the bulk of the world's modem
technology, it is not obvious exactly how MNC technology spreads across international borders
and what role MNCs play in the process. One reason, of course, is that "technology" is an
inherently abstract concept, and therefore difficult to observe and evaluate. None of the available
measures of technology and technology production - such as R&D expenditures, numbers of new
3patents, payments for licenses and royalties, stocks of capital equipment, and so forth - cover
more than a part of this.
Another reason is that technology is diffused in many different ways. MNC technology can
spread to new users through formal market transactions -transfers - or through informal, non-
market mediated channels that may be voluntary or involuntary. For each alternative, the role of
MNCs can be either active or passive. Table 1 shows some of the possible modes of international
technology diffusion, grouped according to the type of transaction and role of the MNC. Foreign'
direct investment is another potential channel of technology transfer, but we have not included it
explicitly in the table: what distinguishes FDI from sales of equipment or licenses to outsiders (or
even joint ventures) is that the MNC has chosen to retain the control and ownership of its
proprietary technologies within the corporation.
TABLE 1  International Diffusion of Technology:
Type of Transaction and Role of MNCs
Role of MNCs
Type of Transaction  ACTIVE  PASSE
FORMAL  joint ventures,  goods trade
licensing
INFORMAL  linkages  trade journals,
scientific exchange
Source: Adapted from Fransman (1985).
It is an open question which of the transfer modes mentioned in the table is the most important,
because it is difficult to compare the technology content of the different transactions, and because
there are no comprehensive data available to measure the magnitude of the informal transfers.
However, there are some old data provided by the UNCTC (1985) on formal transactions that are
useful in outlining the quantitative dimensions, although the figures are neither complete nor
4extremely accurate. For instance, the industrialized countries imported USD 310 billion worth of
machinery and transport equipment in 1980, whereas their yearly payments for technology and
technical and management services in the early 1980s only amounted to approximately USD 10
billion. Concurrently, the developing countries' imports of machinery and transport equipment
from dleveloped  countries reached USD 129 billion, and their payments of royalties, fees, and
remuneration for technical services totaled about USD 2.5 billion. There are no data on the
overall importance of joint ventures, but, for comparison, it can be noted that the industrialized
countries' inward stock of foreign investment was estimated at approximately USD 401 billion in
1983, while the corresponding figure for developing countries was USD 138 billion (UNCTC,
1988, p. 25).'
There are also some data available to describe the extent of MNC participation in licensing
and gcoods  trade. These data are interesting because they confirm that MINCs  are the main sources
of these types of technology, but also because they indirectly introduce foreign direct investment
into the picture. MNCs control technology supplies by virtue of their ownership of proprietary
technologies, but they also account for a significant share of the demand, via their foreign
affiliates. This is most apparent for the transfers of "disembodied" technology that are captured
by data on trade in royalties, licenses, and patent rights. Over 80 per cent of the registered
payments to the United States for technology sales during the 1970-1985 period were made by
foreigni  affiliates of US firms (Grosse, 1989). More than 90 per cent of the technology payments
from developing countries to Germany in the early 1980s, and over 60 percent of the payments to
Japan, originated from their own foreign affiliates (UNCTC, 1988, p. 177).
The intra-firm character of the technology transfers that take place through trade in capital
equipment and other products is less apparent, but still distinguishable. What we know about
MNC involvement from statistics on goods trade is that between 70 and 80 per cent of the goods
exports of both the US and the UK -the main suppliers of embodied technology together with
Japan and Germany - are accounted for by MNCs (UNCTC, 1988, p. 90). Moreover, a significant
share of the exports and imports of the major home countries (between one fifth and one third
overall, and more for complex and technologically sophisticated goods that supposedly embody
5more technology) flow between MNC parents and affiliates (UNCTC, 1988, p. 91). A very
important part of all formal technology transfers are, therefore, closely tied to FDI.
As already mentioned, there are no comprehensive data on the informal modes of
technology diffusion, but it seems that FDI plays an important role also there. For instance,
linkage effects can take place between firms in different countries, like when exporters learn
from the feedback they receive from their multinational customers abroad (Fransman, 1985), but
are perhaps stronger when they arise between local firns  and MNC affiliates operating in the
same country (as will be seen in the ensuing discussion of spillovers). Similarly, many informal
transfers where MNCs have a passive role -those that come about as a result of any kind of
personal contact with people who know about MNC technologies - are obviously facilitated by
the presence of foreign affiliates. Of course, there are also transfer types that may be entirely
independent from FDI. Exports from the MNC's home country may be sufficient to prompt
reverse engineering - the practice of taking apart and analyzing products, to learn about the
technologies embodied in them - which is often recognized as one of the main sources of
2 involuntary technology dissemination (Zander, 1991, Chapter 5).  Other informal transfers,
through academic contacts, technical publications, and education abroad can also occur
irrespective of the presence of foreign affiliates.
Thus, although FDI was not included explicitly in Table 1, it nevertheless seems that much
of the international dissemination of technology is connected to foreign direct investment. A
large share of both license sales and sales of technologically advanced products are directed to
MNC affiliates, and FDI therefore seems to be more important for the geographical spread of
technologies than sales of technology to unrelated parties. In addition, many informal contacts
are easier and more important when MNC affiliates are present in the market than when contacts
have to be made across international borders. Keeping this in mind, it is not surprising that FDI is
probably the transfer mode that has received the most attention (see e.g. Enos, 1989).
However, there are important questions related to the role of FDI as a source of technology
for host countries. From the point of view of the host, it is not clear what the actual technological
benefits of FDI are and how they come about. A distinguishing characteristic of direct
6investment, as has already been noted, is that the control and ownership of the technologies used
by the affiliates stay in the MNCs' possession. Is there any significant diffusion of technology to
new users or is the affiliate able to protect its technology from spreading to outsiders? And if
technology is diffused from the MNC affiliates, does it spread through the market or is it diffused
informaally,  and are the multinationals active or passive in this process? Obviously, it is not trivial
to pinpoint the correct position of foreign direct investment in Table 1.
Spillovers of MNC Technology
In the debate on the role of MNCs in international technology transfer, it has sometimes been
suggested that the most significant channels for the dissemination of modern, advanced
technology are external effects or "spillovers" from foreign direct investrment,  rather than formal
technology transfer arrangements (Blomstrom, 1989). It is argued that when firms establish
affiliates abroad and become multinational, they are distinguished from the already established
firms in the host country for two reasons. One is that they bring with them some amount of the
proprietary technology that constitutes their firm-specific advantage and allows them to compete
successfully with local firms who have superior knowledge of local markets, consumer
preferences, and business practices. Another reason is that the entry of the MNC affiliate disturbs
the existing equilibrium in the market and forces local firms to take action to protect their market
shares and profits. Both these changes are likely to cause various types of spillovers that lead to
productivity increases in local firms.
Generally, spillovers are said to take place when the MNCs cannot reap all the productivity
or efficiency benefits that follow in the host country's local firms as a result of the entry or
presence of MNC affiliates. The simplest example of a spillover is perhaps the case where a local
firm improves its productivity by copying some technology used by MNC affiliates operating in
the local market. Another kind of spillover occurs if the entry of an affiliate leads to more severe
competition in the host economy, so that local firms are forced to use existing technology and
resources more efficiently; a third type of spillover effect takes place if the competition forces
7local firms to search for new, more efficient technologies. These effects may take place either in
the foreign affiliate's own industry or in other industries, among the affiliate's suppliers or
customers.
A first reason to suspect that spillovers are important is that the technologies used by MNC
affiliates are not always available in the market (see Blomstr6m and Zejan, 1991). Abstracting
from the fact that several means of extracting technology rents may occur simultaneously in
reality, we can assume that the MNC has three alternative ways to exploit its technological
advantages internationally. The MNC can produce for export in the home country, it can sell its
technology to foreigners, or it can establish an affiliate abroad and control foreign production
directly. 3
However, markets for technology are typically imperfect, which makes the transactions
costs for sales of technology to outsiders high (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Caves, 1996; Teece,
1981). For instance, it is difficult to judge the value of any specific technology and agree about
prices and licensing costs that are acceptable to both parties. Consequently, MNCs often prefer
direct investment before licensing, and the preference for FDI may be particularly strong when
the newest and most profitable technologies (or those that are very close to the MNCs principal
line of business) are exploited. A technology that is exploited through FDI will probably not be
licensed to the local competitors in the host country - the local firms' only chances to gain access
to the technology may lie in reverse engineering or hiring of former MNC employees with
special skills, or some other type of spillover. This reason for the importance of spillovers may
be most valid for the more developed host countries and industries, because the technical skills
required to imitate the newest and most profitable technologies are typically higher (see
Blomstr6m, 1991b).
Another reason why spillovers may be significant is that direct contact with users appears
to be a principal factor explaining technology diffusion. Before a new process or product
innovation is widely spread in the market, potential adopters have limited information about the
costs and benefits of the innovation and may therefore associate it with a high degree of risk. As
the potential adopters come in contact with existing users, e.g. MNC affiliates, information about
8the technology  is diffused,  the uncertainty  regarding  the pros and cons of the innovation  is
reduced,  and the likelihood  of imitation  or adoption  increases.  In this way,  the entry of foreign
affiliates  may demonstrate  the existence  and profitability  of new  products  and processes,  and
encourage  local firms to adopt some  of them: these  diffusion  processes  may  even be repeated
every time innovations  are transferred  from the MNC  parent  to the affiliate.  This is an argument
for spillovers  even  when access  to new  technology  is not restricted  by proprietary  factors,
because information  about  foreign  technology  is generally  more expensive  for local firms than
for M]NC  affiliates.  In addition,  it can be assumed  that "contagion"  effects  are more important  for
developing  host countries,  where indigenous  skills  and information  are in shorter  supply.
4
A third reason  to expect  positive external  effects  from FDI is related  to the typical  features
of MNCs  - scale economies,  high initial  capital  requirements,  intensive  advertising,  and, not
least, advanced  technology.  These  are also industry  characteristics  that signal  high barriers  to
entry, high concentration,  and perhaps  some  inefficiency  that follows  from low levels of
competition.  Entry  by new domestic  firms  into such industries  in potential  host countries  is likely
to be difficult;  MNNCs,  on the other  hand,  are both likely  to enter  just those industries  and be well
equipped  to overcome  the entry barriers.  They can coordinate  their international  operations  and
conce]ntrate  specific  processes  to few locations  if scale  economies  are important  entry  barriers.  If
the barriers  are made up of high capital  costs, MNCs  may have  larger own funds  than local
firms,  or access  to cheaper  financing  on international  markets.  Barriers  related  to product
differentiation  and technology,  finally,  are not likely  to stop  a multinational,  since  these features
often characterize  the MNCs  themselves.  The entry  of MNCs  into this kind of monopolistic
industry  is likely  to increase  the level of competition  and force existing  firms  to become  more
efficient.
3. Empirical  Evidence  on Spillovers
The earliest  discussions  of spillovers  in the literature  on foreign  direct  investment  date  back to
the early 1  960s. The first author  to systematically  include  spillovers  (or external  effects)  among
the possible  consequences  of FDI was MacDougall  (1960),  who analyzed  the general  welfare
9effects of foreign investment. Other early contributions were provided by Corden (1967), who
looked at the effects of FDI on optimum tariff policy, and Caves (1971), who examined the
industrial pattern and welfare effects of FDI.
The common aim of these studies was to identify the various costs and benefits of FDI, and
spillovers were discussed together with several other indirect effects that influence the welfare
assessment, such as those arising from the impact of FDI on government revenue, tax policies,
terms of trade, and the balance of payments. The fact that spillovers were taken into account was
generally motivated by empirical evidence from case studies rather than by comprehensive
theoretical arguments - the detailed theoretical models analyzing spillovers did not appear until
the late 1  970s.5 Yet, the early analyses made clear that MNCs may improve allocative efficiency
by entering into industries with high entry barriers and reducing monopolistic distortions, and
induce higher technical efficiency if the increased competitive pressure or some demonstration
effect spurs local firms to more efficient use of existing resources. They also proposed that the
presence may lead to increases in the rate of technology transfer and diffusion. More specifically,
case studies showed that foreign MNCs may:
*  contribute to efficiency by breaking supply bottlenecks (but that the effect may become less
important as the technology of the host country advances);
•  introduce new know-how by demonstrating new technologies and training workers who later
take employment in local firms;
*  either break down monopolies and stimulate competition and efficiency or create a more
monopolistic industry structure, depending on the strength and responses of the local firms;
*  transfer techniques for inventory and quality control and standardization to their local
suppliers and distribution channels; and,
*  force local firms to increase their managerial efforts, or to adopt some of the marketing
techniques used by MNCs, either on the local market or internationally.
Although this diverse list gives some clues about the broad range of various spillover effects, it
says little about how comrnon or how important they are in general. This brings up the question
"How can we measure the significance and scope of spillovers?"
10It is not difficult to picture an ideal study of productivity spillovers in host countries. To
examiine  how the development of technology and productivity in individual local firms is related
to the presence of foreign MNC in the local market, the study would require detailed micro data,
both quantitative and qualitative. The study would have to cover several years, to take into
account the fact that spillovers are not instantaneous. It should also include a large number of
firms and industries, so that inter-industry spillovers could be observed, and so that it would be
possible to draw statistically significant conclusions. With this kind of detailed information, it
would also be possible to study productivity spillovers in the home countries of MNCs, and
examiine  the presence of market access spillovers. However, to the best of our knowledge, no
comprehensive analyses of this character have ever been made - one reason, of course, is the
externe  data requirements. Additional empirical evidence on spillovers must therefore be drawn
from two other sources.
Firstly, in addition to the few case studies focusing directly on spillovers, there is a large
number of detailed case studies discussing other aspects of FDI in different countries and
industries, and these studies often contain valuable "circumstantial evidence" of spillovers. For
instance, many analyses of the linkages between MNCs and their local suppliers and
subcontractors have documented learning and technology transfers that may make up a basis for
productivity spillovers or market access spillovers. These studies seldom reveal whether the
MNCs are able to extract all the benefits that the new technologies or information generate
amonlg  their supplier firms, so there is no clear proof of spillovers, but it is reasonable to assume
that spillovers are positively related to the extent of linkages. Similarly, there is much written on
the relation between MNC entry and presence and market structure in host countries, and this is
closely related to the possible effects of FDI on competition in the local markets. There are also
studies of demonstration effects, technology diffusion, and labor training in foreign MNCs  that
are relevant for our purposes.
Secondly, there are a few statistical studies examining the relation between foreign
presence in a host country industry and productivity (or productivity growth) in the locally-
owned share of the industry or in individual locally-owned firms. These studies typically
11estimate production functions for locally-owned firms, and include the foreign share of the
industry as one of the explanatory variables. They then test whether foreign presence has a
significant positive impact on local productivity (or productivity growth) once other firm and
industry characteristics have been accounted for. There are no similar statistical studies of
productivity spillovers in home countries, but there is one study employing statistical techniques
to examine whether firms located near exporting MNCs are more likely than others to become
exporters. Although the data used in these analyses is often limited to few variables, aggregated
to industry level rather than plant level, and in several cases of a cross-section rather than time-
series or panel character, they do provide some important evidence on the presence and pattern of
spillover effects.
To provide an overview of the empirical evidence, we have structured the presentation as
follows: we begin by distinguishing between spillover effects that are related to backward and
forward linkages between MNCs and domestic firms,  and go on to discuss MNC training of
local employees and demonstration effects. In addition, we review the results of the available
statistical studies of spillovers.
Linkages between MNCs and Local Firms
Some of the spillovers from FDI operate via the linkages between the MNC's foreign affiliate
and its local suppliers and customers. The spillovers occur when local firms benefit from the
MNC affiliate's superior knowledge of product or process technologies or markets, without
6 incurring a cost that exhausts the whole gain from the improvement.  Backward linkages arise
from the MNC affiliate's relationships with suppliers, while forward linkages stem from contacts
with customers.
Backward Linkages
Some of the "complementary activities" that may create snillovers through backward linkages
are identified in Lall (1980). In summary, Lall notes that MNCs may contribute to raise the
productivity and efficiency in other firms as they:
12*  help prospective suppliers (domestic as well as foreign) to set up production facilities;
*  provide technical assistance or information to raise the quality of suppliers' products or to
facilitate innovations;
*  provide or assist in purchasing of raw materials and intermediaries;
*  provide training and help in management and organization; and
*  assist suppliers to diversify by finding additional customers.
In his empirical study, Lall (1980) examines two Indian truck manufacturers (one MNC and one
joint venture) and finds significant backward linkages of all five types mentioned above. In
particular, he notes that the truck manufacturers had been active in the establishment of supplier
firms: of the 36 sampled supplier firms, 16 had been launched by the principals. 7 Behrman and
Wallender (1976), who examine the operations of General Motors, ITT, and Pfizer in several
host countries, find similar linkages. They emphasize the ongoing character of the contacts and
information flows between MNCs and their local suppliers. Evidence on the development of
linkages is also provided by e.g. Watanabe (1983a, 1983b) and UNCTC (1981).8
Apart from demonstrating various types of linkages that create a potential for spillovers,
these studies also suggest that the local content in MNC production is one of the determinants of
the strength of linkages. Reuber et al. (1973), in a comprehensive survey of MINC  affiliates in
developing countries, note that over a third of the total value of goods and services purchased
1970 by all affiliates included in their survey were provided by local firms. However, there were
systematic differences in local purchases depending on the affiliates' market orientation, the
parent's nationality, and the host country. Local-market oriented affiliates purchased more from
local firms than did export-oriented affiliates (perhaps because import licenses are easier to
obtain ifor  exporters); European MNCs relied more on local firms than US or Japanese firms
(perhaps because they are generally older and have already built up local supplier networks); and
affiliates in Latin America and India purchased more local inputs than affiliates in the Far East
(probably because of differences in local content requirements). In addition to these factors, it
seems that the technical capability of potential local suppliers must be important to take into
account.
13Moreover, there is a tendency for the share of local inputs to increase over time, also for
export-oriented affiliates. McAleese and McDonald (1978), who study Irish manufacturing
during the period 1952-1974, show that local purchases of inputs increase as the MNC affiliates
mature. Several factors contribute to the gradual development of linkages: further production
processing stages are added over time, the autonomous growth of the manufacturing sector
brings up new suppliers, and some MNC take deliberate action to attract and develop local
suppliers.9 Hence, it is possible that spillovers also become more common over time, as more
and more local firms establish various types of contacts with the foreign MNCs.
In addition to the linkages and spillovers that are result of cooperation between affiliates
and local firms, it is also possible that there are effects that occur as suppliers are forced to meet
the higher standards of quality, reliability, and speed of delivery of the MNCs. For instance,
Brash (1966), in a study of the impact made by General Motors on its Australian local suppliers,
emphasizes the importance of the MNC's stricter quality control, which also had an impact on the
suppliers'  other operations. Katz (1969, p. 154) reports that foreign MNCs operating in
Argentina "forced their domestic suppliers to adopt productive processes and techniques used by
the suppliers of their main firms in their country of origin". Similarly, Watanabe (1983a) notes
complaints from small local producers in the Philippines about the large foreign firms' tough
requirements on both product characteristics and prices: in developing countries, in particular,
this alone may have an effect on what technologies are used, and perhaps also on the general
competitive climate. However, there is very little additional evidence on such "forced linkage
effects".
Some less optimistic conclusion on the effects of linkages are suggested by Aitken and
Harrison (1991), who examine Venezuelan manufacturing between 1976 and 1989, and conclude
that the effect of foreign investment on the productivity of upstream local firms is generally
negative. They assert that foreign firms divert demand for domestic inputs to imported inputs,
which means that the local supplier firms are not able to benefit from potential economies of
scale. Their results differ from most other findings in this respect. One reason is that their study
includes also local firms that have not been fortunate enough to establish linkages with foreign
14affiliates, and because they do not take into account the increase in local content that seems to
take place over time. Yet, their conclusions highlight the need for more research where the
connection between spillovers and linkages is examined explicitly.
Forward Linkages.
There is much less evidence of forward than backward linkages. Only a minority of the firms
studied by Reuber et al. (1973) claimed to have contributed significantly to the development of
local distributors and sales organizations. However, McAleese and McDonald (1978) report that
forward linkages in the Irish economy grew in much the same way as backward linkages. In
particular, they assert that many MNCs commenced operations with heavy export-orientation,
but thiat the importance of the home market has increased over time.
Blomstr6m (199 la) discusses forward linkages in closer detail, and emphasizes the
growing technical complexity in many industries. On the one hand, this could mean that only
MNCs can afford the necessary R&D to develop and manufacture modem products; on the other
hand, industrial application of e.g. computer-based automation and information technologies
might require expertise from the manufacturers. This, he argues, would contribute to increasing
the role of MNC-customer contacts, especially in the smaller countries. One of the few empirical
works touching upon the issue is the study by Aitken and Harrison (1991) noted above. They
conclulde  that spillovers from forward linkages seem to be important in most industries - in fact,
they argue that the downstream effects of foreign investment are generally more beneficial than
the upstream effects.
Summarizing, there is much evidence of the existence and potential of backward linkages,
and a suspicion about the growing importance of forward linkages as well. Some of the host
country characteristics that may influence the extent of linkages - and thereby the extent of
spilloviers  - are market size, local content regulations, and the size and technological capability of
local firns.  Moreover, linkages are likely to increase over time, as the skill level of local
entrepreneurs grows, new suppliers are identified, and local content increases. This constitutes
15circumstantial  evidence  for spillovers,  but it must also be mentioned  that there are hardly any
studies  where  the connection  between  linkages  and spillovers  is explicit.
Training of Local Employees in MNC Affiliates
The transfer  of technology  from MNC parents  to affiliates  is not only embodied  in machinery,
equipment,  patent rights,  and expatriate  managers  and technicians,  but is also realized  through
the training  of the affiliates'  local employees.  This training  affects  most levels of employees,
from simple  manufacturing  operatives  through  supervisors  to technically  advanced  professionals
and top-level  managers.  Types of training  range  from on-the-job  training  to seminars  and more
formal  schooling  to overseas  education,  perhaps  at the parent  company,  depending  on the skills
needed.  Although  higher positions  are often  initially  reserved  for expatriates,  the local share
typically  increases  over time.  The various  skills  gained  while working  for an affiliate  may spill
over as the employees  move  to other  firns, or set up their own  businesses.
The evidence  on spillovers  from the MNC  affiliates'  training  of local employees  is far from
complete,  and comes  mainly from developing  country  studies.  Considering  that the public
education  systems  in developing  countries  are relatively  weaker,  it is also possible  that spillovers
from training  are relatively  more  important  there.  However,  there is scattered  evidence  of effects
in the industrialized  countries,  and then  perhaps  mainly  regarding  management  skills.  It is
possible,  for instance,  that the inter-firm  mobility  of managers  has contributed  to spread specific
management  practices from Japan  to the United  States  and Europe,  and, in earlier  times,  from the
US to Europe  (Caves,  1996).  Moreover,  casual  observation  suggests  that the mobility  of
employees  from MINCs  in the computer  and software  industries  contributes  to spillovers,  both
within the industry  and elsewhere.
Studies  in developing  countries  have  recorded  spillovers  of both technical  and management
skills.  For instance,  Gerschenberg  (1987)  examines  MNCs  and the training  and spread  of
managerial  skills in Kenya.  From detailed  career  data for 72 top and  middle level managers  in 41
manufacturing  firms,  he concludes  that MNCs  offer more  training  of various sorts  to their
managers  than private local firms  do, although  not more  than  joint ventures  or public firms.
16Managers also move from MNCs to other firms and contribute to the diffusion of know-how. Of
the managers in private local and public firms who had training from elsewhere, the majority had
received it while working for MNCs -joint ventures, on the other hand, seemed to recruit mainly
from public firms. Yet, mobility seemed to be lower for managers employed by MNCs than for
mana,gers  in local firms. This is not surprising remembering the common finding that MNCs pay
more for their labor than what local firms do, even taking skill levels into account: in fact, it is
not unreasonable to hypothesize that the fear of a "brain-drain" to local firms is one of the
reasons behind the higher wages in MNCs. Katz (1987) points out that managers of locally
owned firms in Latin America often started their careers and were trained in MNC affiliates. to
Chen (1983), in a study of technology transfer to Hong Kong, chooses to emphasize
training of operatives. In three out of four sampled industries, the MNCs' incidence of
undertaking training and their training expenditures were significantly (several times) higher than
those for local firms. Consequently, he concludes that "the major contribution of foreign firms in
Hong Kong manufacturing is not so much the production of new techniques and products, but
the traLining  of workers at various levels" (p. 61).
Another factor in the dissemination of technology and human capital skills is related to the
R&D efforts undertaken by the MNC affiliates. Here, we will only hint at some of the results in a
very extensive research field. Firstly, MNCs do undertake R&D in their host countries, although
it is strongly concentrated to the home countries. The affiliates' research efforts could be
important, and should be compared with the R&D efforts of local firms, rather than with the
parents' total R&D. Doing so, Fairchild and Sosin (1986) conclude that foreign firms in Latin
America exhibit more internal local R&D activity than is generally presumed, and that their total
expenditures on research are very similar to those of domestic firms. In addition, they have
access to the aggregate know-how base of the parent and related affiliates, and sometimes also to
the parent's R&D facilities. The affiliates' R&D may therefore be more efficient than that of local
firms. Not much is known, however, about what type of R&D is done in affiliates - traditionally,
much has been adaptation of products and processes - and even less is known about the mobility
of R&D personnel or the effects on the host country's technological capability.
17Judging from the aggregate evidence on spillovers from the training of MNC personnel,
there seems to be a definite accumulation of human capital skills in the MNCs' employee stock.
Some of these skills can be appropriated by local firms when employees move to new jobs, but
how much is an open question. The fact that most studies deal with the spread of management
skills suggests that they are less firm-specific than technical skills, and can more easily be used
in other contexts: the empirical evidence, however, is too limited for any more definite
conclusions.
Demonstration Effects
There are a few case studies where pure demonstration effects of FDI on local firms in the host
countries of MNCs have been discussed. Riedel (1975) claim that horizontal demonstration
effects from the operations of MNCs were an important force behind the development of the
manufacturing export sector in Hong Kong in the 1960s. Swan (1973) suggests that
multinationals are important not only for the diffusion of the specific technologies they use, but
more generally because they strengthen international communications channels, which makes
demonstration across international borders possible. Tilton (1971), in a study of the
semiconductor industry, points to the importance of new MNCs in introducing US innovations to
the European countries. Lake (1979), also examining the semiconductor industry, argues that
affiliates of US MNCs have been more active than local firms in the diffusion of new technology
in Great Britain. Mansfield and Romeo (1980) show that the technologies transferred to affiliates
are younger than those sold to outsiders, and that there are cases where the affiliates' technology
imports have induced local competitors to imitate their behavior.
These case studies suggest that demonstration may be an important channel for spillovers.
However, there are too few studies to reveal how important the simple demonstration effects are,
nor do we know whether they are more important in some countries or industries than in others.
One reason is that pure demonstration effects often take place unconsciously: it is seldom
documented how and where a firm first learns about a new technology or product that is
subsequently adopted. Another reason is that demonstration effects are often intimately related to
18competition. Summarizing a comparison of MNC and local technologies, Jenkins (1990, p. 213)
notes that "over time, where foreign and local firms are in competition with each other,
producing simnilar  products, on the same scale and for the same market, there is a tendency for
local firms to adopt similar production techniques to those of the MNCs. Indeed this is part of a
general survival strategy, whereby in order to compete successfully with the MNCs local capital
attempts to imitate the behavior of the MNCs."
Some case studies at the firm and industry level are also available to describe the combined
effects of demonstration and competition from MNCs on local firms. For instance, Langdon
(1981), in a study of FDI in the Kenyan soap industry, reports that the entry of foreign MNCs
also introduced mechanized production, and local firms found themselves unable to sell
handrnade soap in the urban markets. Instead, they were forced to introduce mechanized
techniques to stay in business. Similarly, foreign entry into the Kenyan footwear industry led to
increased competition and changes in the production techniques of local firms (Jenkins, 1990). In
the Brazilian textile industry, the establishment of an affiliate by a foreign firm brought in
synthetic fibers: the consequent stagnation of demand for cotton textiles led to the disappearance
of sorne local firns,  and forced others to seek joint ventures with foreign firms in order to get
access to competitive technology (Evans, 1979).
Some authors have actually hypothesized that the most important influences of MNCs on
local iFirms  operate through the interaction of demonstration and competition (Blomstr6m,
1  986a), and several reasons to expect important effects from competition were noted in the
conceptual discussion: most importantly, MNCs are likely to enter into industries where potential
local challengers are discouraged by high barriers to entry and where competition between
existing local firms may therefore be limited.
In practice, it is difficult to distinguish between effects of demonstration and competition
when it comes to imitation or adoption of new technologies, and the most valuable information
from case studies may therefore be related to how local firms respond to increased competition in
the short run, before imitation takes place. The immediate local reaction may be to merely
enforce stricter or more cost-conscious management and motivate employees to work harder, in
19order to reduce slack or improve X-efficiency. It is possible that this seemingly simple response
may make a more substantial contribution to productivity than improvements in resource
allocation (see Leibenstein, 1966, 1980). Bergsman (1974), on the basis of a study of industry in
six developing countries, argues that X-efficiency is several times as important as allocative
efficiency in increasing incomes in these countries. Also Pack (1974), in a study of LDC manu-
facturing industries, and Page (1980), referring to evidence for three manufacturing industries in
Ghana, suggest that factors related to X-efficiency -mainly management and capacity utilization
- are more important than changes in resource allocation (via changes in relative factor prices) to
improve performance (see also White, 1976).
The potential productivity improvements from these types of reactions are probably larger
in the less developed countries than elsewhere, simply because the initial inefficiencies are often
larger. On the other hand, local firms in the less developed countries may be too weak to mount a
competitive response to foreign entry, whereas the locals in industrialized host countries can
often be expected to reply competitively. Various defensive corporate agreements, such as
amalgamations among local firms or cooperative ventures with other foreign firms, may improve
the local firms' competitiveness, even in developing countries (Blomstr6m, 1986b; Lall, 1979;
Evans, 1977), but there are no direct cross-country comparisons available, and there are not
enough case studies for more comprehensive conclusions. Exactly what the reaction is - and how
important the spillover benefits are - is likely to depend on the initial conditions in the market,
and how much of an impact MNC entry makes on concentration and competition. However, the
evidence seems to suggest that there is a larger risk that foreign MNCs crowd out local firms in
developing countries. We will return to this question in section 4 below.
Statistical Testing of Spillovers
Although there is plenty of empirical evidence of spillovers from the studies reviewed above,
there are only few direct analyses and tests of the existence and significance of spillovers in a
more general setting, presumably because of measurement problems and lack of suitable data.  12
In addition, most of the studies that are available focus on intra-industry effects. An early
20exception is Katz (1969), who notes that the inflow of foreign capital into the Argentine
manufacturing sector in the 1950s had a significant impact on the technologies used by local
firns.  He asserts that the technical progress did not only take place in the MNCs' own industries,
but also in other sectors, because the foreign affiliates forced domestic firms to modernize "by
imposing on them minimum standards of quality, delivery dates, prices, etc. in their supplies of
parts and raw materials" (Katz, 1969, p. 154).
The earliest statistical analyses of intra-industry spillovers include studies for Australia by
Caves (1974), for Canada by Globerman (1979a), and for Mexico by Blomstr6m and Persson
(1983).13  These authors examine the existence of spillovers by testing whether foreign presence -
expressed in tenns of the foreign share of each industry's employment or value added -has any
impact on labor productivity in local firms in a production function framework. Foreign presence
is simaply  included among other firm and industry characteristics as an explanatory variable in a
multiple regression. All three studies conclude that spillovers are significant at this aggregate
level, although they cannot say anything about how spillovers take place.
Some more recent studies also present results that are consistent with these early analyses.
Blomstrom and Wolff (1994) ask whether the spillovers in the Mexican manufacturing sector
were large enough to help Mexican firms converge toward US productivity levels during the
period 1965-1982. Their answer is affirmative: foreign presence seems to have a significant
positive impact on the rates of growth of local productivity. Nadiri (1991b), in a study of the
impact of US direct investment in plant and equipment on the manufacturing sectors in France,
Germany, Japan, and the UK between 1968 and 1988, comes to similar conclusions. Increases in
the capital stock owned by US multinationals seem to stimulate new domestic investment in
plant and equipment, and it appears that there is also a positive impact of FDI on the growth of
total factor productivity in the host countries' manufacturing sectors.
There are also some studies suggesting that the effects of foreign presence are not always
beneficial for local firms. For instance, Haddad and Harrison (1991, 1993), in a test of the
spillover hypothesis for Moroccan manufacturing during the period 1985-1989, conclude that
spillovers do not take place in all industrial sectors. Like Blomstr6m (1986a), they find that
21foreign presence lowers the average dispersion of a sector's productivity, but they also observe
that the effect is more significant in sectors with simpler technology. This is interpreted to mean
that foreign presence forces local firms to become more productive in sectors where best practice
technology lies within their capability, but that there are no significant transfers of modern
technology. Furthermore, they find no significant effects of foreign presence on the rate of
productivity growth of local firms, and interpret this as additional support to the conclusion that
technology spillovers do not occur.
Aitken and Harrison (1991) use plant-level data for Venezuelan manufacturing between
1976 and 1989 to test the impact of foreign presence on total factor productivity growth. They
conclude that domestic firms exhibited higher productivity in sectors with a larger foreign share,
but argue that it may be wrong to conclude that spillovers have taken place if MNC affiliates
systematically locate in the more productive sectors. In addition, they are also able to perform
some more detailed tests of regional differences in spillovers. Examining the geographical
dispersion of foreign investment, they suggest that the positive impact of FDI accrued mainly to
the domestic firms located close to the MNC affiliates. However, effects seem to vary between
industries. Aitken and Harrison (1991) is also one of the few studies, apart from Katz (1969),
where inter-industry spillovers from foreign investment are discussed explicitly. As noted earlier,
they assert that forward linkages generally brought positive spillover effects, but that backward
linkages appeared to be less beneficial because of the foreign firms' high import propensities
(although there were differences between industrial sectors).
Cantwell (1989), who investigates the responses of local firms to the increase in
competition caused by the entry of US multinationals into European markets between 1955 and
1975, also argues that positive technology spillovers did not occur in all industries. His analysis
differs notably from the other studies discussed in this section - he does not focus on
productivity, but rather on changes in the market shares of foreign and local firms - but his
conclusions are interesting. He asserts that "the technological capacity of indigenous firms ... was
the major factor in determining the success of the European corporate response" (p. 86) to the US
challenge, and that the size of the national market was an additional determinant. More
22specifically, Cantwell suggests that the entry of US affiliates provided a highly beneficial
competitive spur in the industries where local firms had some traditional technological strength,
whereas local firms in other industries - especially in countries where markets were too small to
allow both kinds of firms to operate at efficient scale - were forced out of business or pushed to
market segments that were ignored by the foreign MNCs.
Recently, some authors have also explicitly discussed the apparent contradictions between
the earlier statistical spillover studies. In line with Cantwell (1989), Kokko (1994) argues that
spillovers should perhaps not be expected in all kinds of industries. In,particular, foreign MNCs
may sometimes operate in "enclaves", where neither products nor technologies have much in
comnmon  with those of local firms. In such circumstances, there may be little scope for learning,
and spillovers may not materialize. Conversely, when foreign affiliates and local firms are in
more direct competition with each other, spillovers are more likely. Examining data for Mexican
manufacturing, he finds no signs of spillovers in industries where the foreign affiliates have
much higher productivity and larger market shares than local firms; in industries without these
enclave characteristics, on the other hand, there appears to be a positive relation between foreign
presence and local productivity. Kokko, Tansini and Zejan (1996a) present similar findings for
the Uruguayan manufacturing sector.
Another possible explanation for the divergent findings from the existing statistical tests is
proposed by Kokko (1996), who focuses on effects of competition in Mexican manufacturing.
The earlier studies have tested the hypothesis that productivity spillovers are strictly proportional
to foreign presence, but Kokko (1996) argues that this is not always the case. Spillovers from
competition, in particular, are not determined by foreign presence alone, but rather by the
simultaneous interactions between foreign and local firms. Hence, it is possible that the
spillovers are larger in case where a few foreign MNC stir up a previously protected market than
in a situation where foreign affiliates hold large market shares, but refrain from competing hard
with local firms. In fact, sometimes large foreign presence may even be a sign of a weak local
industry, where local firms have not been able to absorb any productivity spillovers at all and
have therefore been forced to yield market shares to the foreign MNCs.
23These recent analyses point to the significance of local conditions in host countries as
determinants of the magnitude and scope of spillovers. A high level of local competence and a
competitive environment, both contribute to raise the absorptive capacity of the host country. In
addition to explaining some of the differences between countries and industries when it comes to
productivity benefits from FDI, they also highlight a possible role for economic policy in host
countries. So far, foreign MNCs have typically been controlled through various types of
performance and technology transfer requirements, but it appears that policies supporting a more
competitive environment are useful alternatives for countries aiming to maximize the
productivity benefits from FDI.14
4. Trade Effects
To enter a foreign market and to become a successful exporter, a company must not only be a
competent manufacturer, but it will also need to manage the international marketing, distribution,
and servicing of its products -tasks that are typically connected with high fixed costs. Few local
firms, particularly those in developing countries, have the skills and resources to take on all these
challenges on their own (see further Keesing and Lall, 1992). A MNC parent or affiliate is likely
to be in a better position to establish export operations, since it can benefit from the existing
international network of the entire corporation. The contacts with other parts of the corporation
provide both knowledge of international market conditions and access to foreign marketing and
distribution networks. Moreover, MNCs are often larger than local firms and may be able to
afford the high fixed costs for the development of transport, communications, and financial
services that are needed to support export activities.
Examining the impact of FDI on the host countries' trade performance, it is useful to
distinguish between direct and indirect effects. Regarding the direct effects on host country
exports, we follow Helleiner (1973), and divide the exports and MNC activities into four
different categories according to production characteristics:
*  local raw material processing,
*  conversion of import-substituting industry to exporting,
24*  new labor-intensive final product exports, and
*  labor-intensive processes and component specialization within vertically integrated
international industries.
In the first category, i.e. processing of locally produced raw materials, MNCs may have better
export potential than indigenous firms in developing countries, because of their business contacts
abroaid,  their marketing skills, superior technology both in product and processes, and their
greater know-how in general. Particularly for the poorest developing countries, where most of
these assets are lacking, foreign firms may be one of the few available alternatives, at least for
the timne  being, if they want to increase their exports.
The same MNC advantages should also be important when countries try to convert import-
substituting industries to exporting (for empirical evidence, see Blomstr6m and Lipsey, 1993). If
this avenue for the expansion of manufactured exports is chosen, one should also consider the
suggestion that multinational corporations may be a significant factor in speeding up free trade,
not least among the developing countries. For instance, it has been noted that MNCs have been
firm supporters of common markets, customs unions, and free trade areas in the developing
countries, since these enable them to rationalize small-scale facilities and develop exports (see
e.g. Helleiner, 1973 and Dunning, 1993). On the other hand, there are reasons to believe that the
MNCs are eager to support protection in host developing countries if the reason for the
investment from the very beginning was the profits provided by protected market. However, with
the decreasing appeal of import-substituting strategies in general in developing countries, the
anti-trade influence of MNCs is expected to be weak.
Multinational corporations are also believed to have more general interests in trade
liberalization in their home countries, particularly in their own products, and it is often said that
these iFirms  have become a significant source of political pressure for freer trade. Given the
currently widespread  perception that there is a hardening of commercial policies in the
developed countries, it is important to analyze what role the MNCs may play here. Are these
firms in a position to facilitate exports from the developing to the developed countries, for
25instance, in labor-intensive final products, and, if so, will they do it on a general basis or will
they lobby only for their own exports?
Some efforts have been made to test the hypothesis that protection is lower on products
that are of special interest to the MNCs. For instance, Lavergne (1983) and Helleiner (1977)
tested whether United States MNCs acted as a free-trade force in support of imports of their
majority-owned foreign affiliates, but no conclusive evidence was found. In this context, it can
be noted that Bhagwati (1988) argues that it is not meaningful to look for pro-trade influences of
multinational corporations in cases of successful opposition to  particular protectionist pressures.
He asserts that MNCs are in opposition to protectionism in general in their home countries to
avoid possible outbreaks of protectionism elsewhere, so that they act as an important free-trade
force, not in specific sectors, but at higher levels.
When it comes to exports of new labor-intensive final products, such as textiles and other
consumer goods, history seems to tell that there are many opportunities for developing countries
to become significant exporters even without the help from foreign finns. Such a conclusion
would, however, understate the importance and contribution of multinational corporations in
these exports. Firms in developing countries seeking to expand their exports to developed
countries face immense difficulties in setting up a distribution network, keeping in close touch
with the rapid change in consumer tastes, mastering the technicalities of industrial norms and
safety standards, and building up a new product image. In many cases, the design, packaging,
distribution, and servicing of the products are as important as being able to produce them at (or
below) ruling prices in world markets, and the lack of such skills constitutes a key entry barrier
to markets for developing country exporters.
The story behind the success of many developing country firms entering world markets in
light consumer goods is that foreign firms help them  by providing the links to the final buyers
(Blomstrom, 1990). Usually, firms in developed countries seek out manufacturers in developing
countries and bring them under contract as suppliers. The former may be import-wholesalers in
narrow product lines, large department store chains or, as in East Asia, Japanese trading
companies dealing in a wide variety of products. Many of these firms are true MNCs with outlets
26in several countries, and by not taking their activities into account, we significantly overstate the
opportunities for developing countries to enter markets for labor-intensive final products.
Hence, although the local suppliers of MNCs do not always export under their own name,
they benefit from access to foreign markets. This may allow them to expand output and achieve
economies of scale. It is also likely that the linkages with export oriented MNCs provide
knowledge about product and process technologies and foreign market conditions - for instance,
foreign preferences regarding design, packaging, and product quality - and if this information can
be used profitably in the supplier companies' other operations, there may be important external
effects from contacts with foreign MNCs (see Keesing and Lall, 1992).
Exports of labor-intensive components within vertically integrated industries are almost by
definition dependent on the participation of MNCs. Generally, we think of these exports as intra-
firm trade, but a great part of them are arm's-length transactions between MNCs and indigenous
LDC firms (although the MNCs usually take responsibility for the marketing and distribution of
the products). However, since this type of production is often dependent on imports of raw
materials and intermediate goods, it is not obvious that the net earnings of foreign exchange will
be significant. The main benefits from export processing are instead related to increased
employment, skills, wages, and taxes, at least in the short run (see Kobba, 1986, for an analysis
of the effects of such foreign direct investment in Tunisia).
Countries that choose to specialize in labor-intensive processes and components production
for MNCs also have to take into account that these affiliates are relatively "footloose", with little
physical capital nailed down to hinder movement to the most favorable environment (see e.g.
Flamrn, 1984). Decisions taken by the parents may lead to sudden changes in the production of
their affiliates in different countries, without necessarily taking into account the interest of host
countries.  This may happen as a result of changes in the costs of production, the perception of
risks, or the policy environment in different host countries (UNCTC, 1985).
In addition to the export influences that require some type of linkage between MNCs and
local firms, there may also be several indirect effects that benefit local export performance. In the
simplest case, local firms may learn how to succeed in foreign markets simply by copying
27MNCs, although more tangible externalities are usually needed. For instance, MNCs may have
affiliated firms in the prospective export market who can lobby for trade liberalization, and local
firms may benefit from any reductions of trade barriers that are achieved. There may be spare
capacity in the distribution or marketing facilities created by MNCs, which local firms may use
at or slightly above marginal cost. The MNCs may also train their local staff in export
management, and these skills may spill over to local firms if the MNCs employees change jobs.
Other channels for the diffusion of information on foreign market conditions are trade
associations and other industry organizations, of which MNCs are often prominent members.
This kind of "market access spillovers" may be most important where the indigenous resources
are weakest, i.e. in developing countries.
In one of the few available statistical analyses of export externalities, Aitken, Hanson and
Harrison (1994) hypothesize that one firm's export activities may reduce the costs for foreign
market access of other potential exporters that are located nearby. Testing a logit-specification
for over 2,000 Mexican manufacturing plants during the period 1986-1990, they find that
locating near an exporting MNC raises the probability of exporting for an individual firm, but
that there is no corresponding effect from locating near locally-owned exporters. Hence, Aitken,
Hanson and Harrison (1994, p. 25) conclude that "Foreign-owned enterprises are a natural
conduit for information about foreign markets and technology, and a natural channel through
which domestic firms can distribute their goods. To the extent that foreign investors directly or
indirectly provide information and distribution services, their activities enhance the export
prospects of local firms." Although their study cannot say anything about what the channels for
market access spillovers are, they are able to demonstrate that the effects are significant at the
national level.
Similarly, Kokko, Tansini and Zejan (1996b) find that the presence of foreign MNCs raises
the likelihood that local Uruguayan firms are involved in exporting. However, this effect only
applies for exports to the world market, while exports to the neighboring countries Argentina and
Brazil appear not to be influenced by foreign presence. Moreover, only foreign MNCs
established in Uruguay during the relatively outward-oriented period since 1973 -but not MNCs
28established during the preceding import-substituting period - seem to have any influence on the
probability that local firms are engaged in exporting.
5. Competitive and Anti-Competitive Effects
It was argued earlier that MNCs may improve industrial efficiency and resource allocation in
their hiost countries by entering into industries where high entry barriers reduce the degree of
domestic competition. The entry of MNCs into these monopolistic industries is likely to raise the
level of competition and force existing firms to become more efficient. Foreign entry may, of
course, also lead to a fall in the number of firms in the industry if the least efficient local
companies are forced out of business. This raises the fear that foreign MNCs may outcompete all
local ifirms  and establish monopolies that are even worse than the domestic oligopolies they
replace: in addition to restricting competition, there is a risk that MNC monopolies may also
repatriate profits and avoid taxation through transfer pricing.
However, it is likely that competition generally becomes more fierce, because the MNC
affiliates' strategies typically stir up the established patterns of "gentlemanly competition".
Hence, it has been said that "whatever the market structure that results from the influence of
direct investment, it can be argued that entry by a foreign subsidiary is likely to produce more
active rivalrous behavior and improvement in market performance than would a domestic entry
at the same initial scale" (Caves, 1971, p. 15). Another point to note is that the increase in
competition is often more effective in inducing technological change and productivity
improvements than profit incentives, since "threats of deterioration or actual deterioration from
some previous state are more powerful attention-focusing devices than are vague possibilities for
improvements" (Rosenberg, 1976, p. 124).
Yet, the uncertainty regarding the generality of competition effects motivates an
examination of some studies of FDI and industry structure in host countries. One central problem
here is the question whether MNC entry and presence explain industry structure, or whether
industry structure determines if MNCs will enter or not. This is an important question, since we
have argued that one of the reasons to expect significant effects of foreign presence is the
29improvement in efficiency and resource allocation that may follow from MNC entry into
monopolistic host country industries. Another problem is that there is some confusion regarding
effects that are endemic to MNCs and those that are only speeded up by MNC presence. Few
authors have been able to make a proper distinction between these two effects, but it may not be
a crucial issue in the present context. What matters is the impact made by MNCs, and not the
question of whether it is caused by foreign ownership or some other of the MNCs' characteristics.
Yet another (perhaps more important) complication is that there is no simple relationship
between competition and efficiency, on the one hand, and concentration, on the other hand. This
will warrant some further comments later.
Moving to the empirical findings, it is clear that the overwhelming majority of studies are
able to establish a positive correlation between foreign entry and presence and seller
concentration in host country industries (see e.g. Dunning, 1993 and Caves, 1996, for surveys).
However, the causal links are more difficult to establish. One finding is that the correlation
disappears once other determinants of concentration are taken into account, and that MNCs do
not cause concentration but are drawn to concentrated industries (Fishwick, 1981; Globerman,
1979b). Knickerbocker (1976) shows that entries by MNCs into the US market in the 1960s led
to lower concentration, and that the same pattern was evident also for Canada, Italy, France, and
West Germany. Commenting on these and other studies, Caves (1996, p. 89) concludes that the
"'correlations do not themselves prove that any direct causal relationships exist between foreign
investment and concentration". It should, however, be noted that most of the studies look at
effects of MNC entry, and it is possible that the concentration-reducing impact does not hold for
already established affiliates, who may instead be interested in building barriers to entry.
Regarding the studies of developing countries, most authors have not been able to - or have
not even tried to - determine whether the high degrees of concentration in the industries where
foreign affiliates are present have been caused by MNCs or whether MNCs have just been
attracted to these industries by good profit opportunities. Two (seemingly contradictory)
exceptions are Evans (1977), who claims that MNCs tended to reduce concentration in the
oligopolistic Brazilian pharmaceutical industry, and Newfarmer (1979), who argues for the
30opposite  effect  - caused  by interlocking  directorates,  collusion,  cross-subsidization,  and other
"oligopolistic tactics" - in the Brazilian electrical equipment industry.
Lall (1978)  hypothesizes  that it is plausible  that MNCs  speed  up the natural concentration
process in LDCs, or that the weakness  of local competitors  allows MNCs  to achieve  a higher
degree  of market  dominance  than  in developed  countries.  Lall (1979)  proceeds  to argue  that the
level of concentration  probably  falls in the short  run following  MNC entry,  as the affiliate  adds
to the number  of firms  in the industry,  but that this may be reversed  in the long run. The MNCs
may buy out local firms  or force  them out of business,  their success  may force  local firms  to
fusionis  and amalgamations,  or they  may be more skilled  as lobbyists  than others,  thus adding  to
entry barriers  and protection.  Looking  at the effects  of MNCs  on concentration  in 46 Malaysian
industries,  he asserts  that the presence  of foreign  firms  on balance  increased  concentration.  This
was brought  about  both by the MNCs'  impact  on general  industry  characteristics  - such as higher
initial capital  requirements,  capital  intensity,  and advertising  intensity  -and by some  apparently
independent  effect of foreign  presence,  perhaps  related  to "predatory"  conduct,  changes  in
technology  and marketing  practices,  or gains  of policy  concessions  from the government.  Similar
results were reported  for Mexico  in Blomstrom  (1  986b).  Thus,  the evidence  seems  to suggest  that
there is a larger risk that MNCs  crowd  out local firms  in LDCs  than in developed  countries.
The assumption  implicit  in much of the discussion  above  is that competition  improves
efficiency  and welfare,  but there are cases  where  it must not necessarily  be that way. Firstly,
economies  of scale are important  determinants  of industrial  productivity.  To the extent  that
foreign  entry increases  concentration  in relatively  small national  industries,  resource  allocation
and efficiency  may well  improve  from the increase  in average  firm size.  Whether  this effect  is
stronger  than that from the presumably  reduced  competition  depends  on market  characteristics
and trade policy.  For instance,  a fall in the number  of competitors  from thirty  to twenty  must not
necess,arily  harm the competitive  environment,  but a reduction  from three  to two certainly  will.
Similarly,  increased  concentration  is likely  to have more  harmful  effects  in protected  industries
than in import-competing  or export-oriented  industries.' 5
31In fact, free trade and imports may well be good substitutes for large numbers of domestic
competitors: Scandinavian, and particularly Swedish, industrial policies have for a long time
built on this assertion (Hjalmarsson, 1991), although the competition between the few remaining
large firms has also been important (Porter, 1990; S6lvell, Zander, and Porter, 1991). The
conclusion by Chen (1983, p. 90) from his study of Hong Kong manufacturing, where all
industries are either export-oriented or import-competing, is consistent with these arguments:
"There are indications that the presence of foreign investment in an industry may have the effect
of eliminating wasteful competition ... [without introducing] damaging monopolistic elements
into the industry".
Secondly, focusing more closely on technology, there is the classic "Schumpeterian
Dilemma" of weighing the static allocative efficiency of competitive markets against the
supposed dynamic efficiency of monopolistic and oligopolistic firms. The rate of technical
progress can perhaps be higher in concentrated markets, since firms there have internally
generated profits to use for R&D, and are generally larger and more able to enjoy economies of
scale in R&D. It is also possible that market structure has some impact on what the R&D efforts
aim to achieve.
In fact, empirical studies seem to show that market structure affects both the rate and type
of technical progress. Looking at the overall rate of technical change, Kamien and Schwartz
(1982) summarize a survey of research in industrialized countries by concluding that neither
perfect competition nor perfect monopoly, but rather mildly oligopolistic markets, are most
conducive to technical progress. Moreover, Katz (1984) and Teitel (1984) in studies of Latin
America, and Lall (1980) for India, show that technical change in industries with limited
competition largely aims to overcome supply bottlenecks, e.g. by substituting imported raw
materials and components, while change in more competitive industries is characterized by cost-
reducing and quality-improving innovations. In these cases, however, limited competition is
intimately tied to import-substitution rather than concentration, although there is a certain
overlap.
32Summarizing the evidence on the relation between MNC entry and presence and industry
structure, it seems that MNCs enter mainly into industries where barriers to entry and
concentration are relatively high, and initially add to the number of firms in the market. In the
long run, MNCs may contribute to some increase in concentration, but efficiency may still
benefiit,  particularly if protection does not guarantee an easy life also for the MNC affiliate. Most
of the evidence, however, is related to MNC entry rather than to MNC presence - the dynamic
aspects of MNCs and competition in host country markets are not well researched. Moreover,
much of the evidence refers to effects in developed countries, and it is not possible to disregard
the risk that MNC entry into developing countries replaces local production and forces local
firms out of business, rather than forcing them to become more efficient.
5. Concluding Remarks
This paper has reviewed the evidence on host country effects of foreign direct investment. The
focus of the discussion has been on the transfer and diffusion of technology from foreign
multinationals to the host country, since MNCs own and control the bulk of the world's
commercial technology. In addition, we have examined the impact of foreign MNCs for the trade
performance of their host countries, and the effects on competition and industry structure in the
host countries.
A tentative conclusion of the review is that foreign direct investment may promote
econoimic  development by contributing to productivity growth and exports in their host countries.
However, the exact nature of the relation between foreign MNCs and their host economies seems
to vary between industries and countries. It is reasonable to assume that the characteristics of the
host country's  industry and policy environment are important determinants of the net benefits of
FDI. T  his paper has not explicitly dealt with questions related to host country policies vis-a-vis
foreign MNCs, but the findings of the paper highlight the need for future research in this area.
Notes
33Some authors argue, in spite of the lack of more comprehensive evidence, that goods trade is
the main channel of technology transfer for most countries. See e.g. Gomulka (1990), p. 161 and
Kaplinsky (1990), p. 21.
2One  of the few comprehensive quantitative assessments of the importance of imitation and
reverse engineering is de Melto et al. (1980). They report that half of a sample of 280 significant
innovations commercialized in Canada between 1960 and 1979 could be characterized as
"imitations", and that more than half of these resulted from reverse engineering. Mansfield,
Schwartz, and Wagner (1981) find that 60 per cent of the patented innovations in their sample
were imitated within 4 years. Kim and Kim (1985) also present evidence of imitation and
informal technology transfers in 42 South Korean firms. We will not examine these studies in
detail because they do not focus on foreign investment, but it should be remembered that MNC
presence in the host country probably facilitates imitation of MNC technology.
3 The determinants of the MNCs' choice between exports, licensing, and foreign direct
investment are not discussed in this study, but treated in detail by e.g. Blomstr6m and Zejan
(1991), Contractor (1984), Davidson (1980, 1983), Davidson and McFetridge (1985), Stobaugh
(1988), Telesio (1979), Vernon and Davidson (1979), and Zander (1991).
4Mansfield  and Romeo (1980) present indirect evidence also for this argument. They claim that
the export of technologies from parents to U.S. affiliates abroad speeded up the emergence of
competing products or processes in the host countries by an average of 2.5 years in about a third
of their cases. In addition, they report that more than half of the managers of a sample of British
firms believed that they had introduced some products and processes earlier as a consequence of
transfers of technology to U.S. affiliates operating in the United Kingdom. More evidence will be
presented later, in the survey of empirical studies of spillovers.
5 For theoretical studies, see e.g. Findlay, (1978), Koizumi and Kopecky (1977), Das (1987), and
Wang and Blomstrom (1992). Some other early empirical studies are Balasubramanyam (1973),
Brash (1966), Deane (1970), Dunning (1958), Forsyth (1972), Gabriel (1967), Rosenbluth
(1970), and Safarian (1966).
346However, the existence of linkages does not prove that there are spillovers, but the two are
probably closely related. Even if the MNC affiliate charges for the support it provides to their local
suppliers and distributors, it is not always able to extract the full value of the resulting productivity
increases.
7The  dLomestic  content in Lall's two cases was extremely high -probably over 90 per cent - and
both firms had extensive supplier networks, with 500 and 339 independent suppliers, respectively.
It should be noted that these characteristics  already distinguish  the Indian experience from others,
since an extreme import substitution policy made India a virtually closed economy until the mid-
1980s. Hill (1982), who examines the Philippine appliance and motor cycle industries, argues that
inter-firm linkages are often significantly weaker than in the Indian case. More liberal import
policies reduce local content, the smaller size of most markets makes much production
economnically  unviable, and the assembler character of many principal firms makes them incapable
of offering technical assistance to suppliers. Similarly, Lindsey (1989) argues that the positive
impact of MNCs on the Philippine economy has been very limited.
°Lall (1978) reviews numerous other studies of linkages between MNCs and local firms, and
Halbach (1989) summarizes a detailed study of subcontracting  and linkages in several South-East
Asian industries.
9 This last point is noted in numerous other studies. Dunning (1958), one of the earliest
contributions, maintains that foreign firms are generally engaged in the training of local suppliers.
In addition to the comprehensive  evidence on local content, Reuber et al. (1973) argue that MNCs
actively support the establishment of independent local suppliers. Lim and Pang (1982) also
underscore this in their study of the Singapore electronics industry: they point specifically at the
role of MNCs in suggesting entrepreneurial  possibilities and assisting in the establishment of
supplier firms, and their "willingness  to bear the initial costs of encouraging and patronizing local
suppliers, who in the long run would be cost-competitive"  (p. 591). What distinguishes their study
is, firstly, that it is concerned with export-oriented  TNCs whereas most others look at import-
competing industries, and secondly, that they show how the development of linkages in Singapore
35was relatively rapid during the late 1970s while most other studies seem to suggest a much slower
process.
IOWasow  and Hill (1986) provide similar evidence for the dissemination of management skills in
the Philippine insurance industry. Likewise, Yoshihara (1988) underlines the importance of training
in foreign companies (and overseas education) for Chinese-owned  fims  in South-East Asia.
Behrman and Wallender (1976) recognize spillovers  of both managerial and technical skills. In
particular, they note that several of the MNC affiliates' subcontractors had been established by
former employees. Hill (1982) also identifies similar cases in the Philippine appliance and motor
cycle industries, but argues that they were insignificant.  Nevertheless, 12 out of 20 assembler firms
had some subcontractors that were established by former employees.
" For some recent studies touching on these issues, see Cantwell (1995), Patel and Pavitt (1994),
and Zander (1994).
12 It should also be noted in this context that both intra-industry and inter-industry R&D spillovers
have been identified and estimated, mainly for developed countries, but generally without explicit
reference to MNCs and FDI. See e.g. Bernstein (1988, 1989) and Nadiri (1991a). The fact that this
kind of spillover seems to take place offers some indirect support to the hypothesis that there are
technology spillovers between MNC affiliates and local finns. The conclusion that technological
innovations (proxied by R&D measures) in some domestic firms have positive effects on the
productivity of other domestic firms is analogous to the situation where technological innovations
(proxied by the size of the technology gap or the amount of technology imports) in foreign affiliates
have positive effects on the productivity of local firms.
13 See also Blomstr6m (1989). Moreover, Chen (1983) presents a detailed discussion and some
statistical evidence of spillovers in the major manufacturing industries in Hong Kong, although he
does not examine the whole manufacturing sector.  More specifically, he shows that foreign firms
have been more active than local firms in importing new technologies to Hong Kong, and that the
rates of technology diffusion have been higher in the industries  where foreign firtns hold larger
market shares.
3614 For instance,  Blomstr6m,  Kokko  and Zejan  (1994)  and  Kokko  and Blomstrom  (1995)  show  that
the technology  imports  of foreign  affiliates  are partly  determined  by the competition  in the host
country  market.
5 The Peruvian  automotive  industry  in the late 1960s  and early 1970s  (like  many other  industries  in
countries  with  extreme  import-substitution  policies)  provides  a striking  example  of the fact  that low
concentration  does  not necessarily  equal  high efficiency.  At that time,  "13 finns, each  with some
foreign  ownership,  were assembling  18  brands  and over  25 models  of automotive  vehicles,  mostly
passenger  cars. Facing  a limited  local  market,  none  of these  finns was able  to use more  than  30 per
cent  of its installed  capacity"  (UNCTC,  1981,  p. 19).
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